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Human Values as a Source for Sustainin g
the Environment
Naomi Zack
Every form of life has value regardless of its worth to human beings .
-Earth Charter, Principle la
Due to the overwhelming dominance of homo sapiens, natural environments ar e
no longer self-sustaining, and their continued existence will depend on huma n
agreement to sustain them . Given present commercial historical realities, such
agreement will require new kinds of moral reasoning about the relationship be-
tween human beings and ecological systems .
The preservation of natural environments is obviously of great human util-
ity as a source of valued things . But the sustenance of natural ecosystems and
their inhabitants, on the basis of their intrinsic worth, does not yet have an ef-
fective theoretical defense against human speciesism, the continual expansion o f
capitalistic systems, and the present dependence of humans on human-mad e
physical and social environments . The intrinsic worth of natural ecosystems has
been explained by proponents of deep ecology and maintained within traditiona l
indigenous cultures, but such advocacy seems thus far to operate in a cognitiv e
dimension separate from the rest of Western (i .e., "Northern/Euro-American/
secular-technological") moral reasoning . So the question is, How can we West-
erners bring intuitions, insights, and traditions concerning the intrinsic worth of
natural systems and beings into the discourse of recognized practical reason, or
moral argument ?
The three dominant moral theories of utilitarianism or consequentialism,
virtue ethics, and deontology are each plausible systems to apply to natural sys-
tems and beings . However, I shall argue that only deontology is capable of ac-
complishing the required theoretical goals, because only deontology could con-





Jeremy Bentham (1823) was the first to note that the test for inclusion in th e
domain of those whose well-being counts is not the capacity for rationa l
thought, but the ability to suffer. ("The question is not, Can they reason? Nor ,
Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?") So, we could extend a utilitarian calculu s
to natural subjects. But, utilitarian insights do not tell us how to weigh the bene-
ficial consequences to natural subjects, or what to do when human goods are
maximized to a greater extent than nonhumans are harmed . Utilitarianism yield s
a model of humane treatment of nonhuman life, which could result in the ex-
tinction of such life whenever humans believe that the pain suffered by nonhu-
mans is too great . If nonhuman absence of pain is not sufficient for calculating
maximal results for nonhumans, it is not clear how humans could define non
-
human flourishing . For example, do animals flourish if they are forced to subsis t
in the margins of their ecosystems, or, do they flourish if new ecosystems ar e
artificially created for them? But even if something like John Stuart Mill's con-
cept of "higher pleasures" is applied to animals or ecosystems as a standard fo r
sustainable conditions under which they flourish, the flourishing of nonhuman
beings is still likely to be judged not as important as the flourishing of huma n
beings. This would be particularly true when the nonhuman being is an entir e
ecosystem likely to be jeopardized by development that will enhance huma n
livelihood and happiness .
Virtue ethics looks more promising because the moral ground is higher an d
provides a perspective from which we can value natural beings in a way totall y
apart from their use to us. We can value them and teach our children to value
them as an expression and extension of what is best in our character . Indeed, our
own flourishing may require an appreciation of, and respect for, natural being s
in ways that treat such beings with the utmost moral and aesthetic seriousness .
Thus, Thomas Hill (1983) explains how our behavior toward natural beings re-
veals the presence or absence of human traits such as sensitivity, humility, an d
gratitude .
The problem with the virtue ethics approach is that it seems to relegate the
sustenance of natural environments and beings to the province of manners an d
sensibility. This aspect of human life is personally and socially important onl y
after pressing problems of survival have been solved, and it is not usually a pri-
ority in the face of human need and suffering. More problematic, the sustenance
of natural beings as part of the development of human virtue remains an enter -
prise in which humans, and not those natural beings, are central . On a good day,
when I am not too pressured by concerns directly affecting my livelihood, I ma y
make a contribution to the preservation of rain forests . And why, as a matter of
virtue? Because it will reflect well on me in contexts where I have to account for
myself, and more important, will strengthen my virtue of generosity . Something
stronger than this kind of rationale would seem to be necessary if sustenance o f
natural environments is a serious moral issue .
I now turn to deontology. I want to examine the radical view that we need
to assent to a general principle which will admit natural beings to what Kant
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called "the kingdom of ends ." This can be accomplished only if natural beings
are granted the status of persons, in the same ways in which human beings ar e
persons . Such recognition will require competent, adult human representatives ,
similar to the ways in which the human personhood of children and adults o f
diminished capacity is represented by parents and guardians . Mere stewardship
or trusteeship over ecosystems and their inhabitants will not succeed in protect-
ing them from depredation and eventual destruction because that kind of repre-
sentation is at best defensive . Once the defense is overcome, for example, once
the land is wrested into the commercial domain, there is at present nothing ille-
gal or broadly immoral about its destruction . By contrast, the parental rights o r
guardianship of children and adults of diminished capacity can only be abro-
gated if children and wards grow up or acquire full capacity . Children and wards
are not "adventured" to the fortunes of the marketplace if one particular guardi-
anship comes to an end, because their need of guardianship is absolute .
If an ecosystem had the status of a person, then depriving it of life or as-
saulting its inhabitants would be in principle no different from crimes of murde r
or assault committed against human beings . One can imagine a situation in
which killing members of an endangered species would be a far more serious
crime than it is in most places at present, but this does not capture what is dis-
tinctive about personhood . Even if deliberately killing natural beings were a
capital crime, as things now stand, so long as such beings are not persons, th e
reason for the punishment would rest on something different from their inheren t
rights .
I once heard Winona LaDuke, a North American spokesperson for indi-
genist concerns, talk about a hydroelectric project that had required extensive
flooding of land, so that, among other ecological results, 10,000 elk wer e
drowned. "Who gave them the right," she asked, "to drown 10,000 elk?" (See
also LaDuke 1999.) I think that is the kind of question which has to be addresse d
in moral reasoning that is relevant to the sustenance of natural environments .
In a secular capitalistic society, the rights of ecosystems and their inhabi-
tants would have to be constructed . This could be done by basing such rights on
the same kinds of moral sentiments and intuitions that motivate doctrines o f
universal human rights . The twentieth century has not provided good reason t o
be optimistic about such doctrines, but their worth as ideals remains indisput-
able . Thus, even if there were not universal agreement and compliance about
i ncluding ecosystems and their inhabitants in the "kingdom of ends," the con -
sensual and practical limits of the theoretical inclusion would not detract fro m
its value as an ideal . (Human secular morality is an ongoing project . )
The grounds for human secular morality are ultimately unreasoned in th e
deontological sense . I cannot "prove" that it is wrong to drown 10,000 elk or t o
allow twelve million children to starve to death . Unfortunately, either you "see"
the wrongness of one or both of these things, or you do not . Similarly, there are
reasons short of proof which can be given for granting the status of persons to




proposing fictitious personhood, as in the case of corporations, but real person
-
hood.)
1. Ecosystems and their inhabitants are living beings, like human beings ,
and they are entitled to the same rights that human beings are supposed to have
.
(I am simply asserting the consequent here, not claiming that it follows from th e
antecedent.)
2. As living beings, it is possible to say that some states of affairs, primaril y
their ongoing life, or their sickness and death, are better or worse for natura l
beings. It follows from this that natural beings have positive interests as do hu-
man beings .
3. The interests of natural beings, while dependent on the forbearance and
assistance of humans, are not in particular cases dependent on particular human
beings . This independence of natural beings is analogous to the independence of
a human child, in distinction from the dependence of fetuses, who require th e
support of particular individuals .
4, Many human beings have compassionate sentiments for natural beings,
as they do for other humans. They suffer when natural beings are injured and ar e
satisfied and pleased when they flourish. If compassion as a motive is also a
reason to curtail the suffering, and promote the flourishing, of humans, then th e
same holds for natural beings .
5 . There is good reason to believe that natural beings suffer when they ar e
injured or destroyed and this similarity to human life is an important qualifica-
tion for admission to the realm of persons because the one secular basis for uni-
versal human rights is the capacity to suffer .
What would be the consequences of person status for nonhuman beings?
First, they would have a fundamental right to life . They would also have politi-
cal rights, expressed through their human representatives, as well as rights t o
"free speech," expressed in the same way, and other rights, such as freedom o f
association . There would be a presumption of their liberties, chief of whic h
would be the negative right not to be bought or sold . This last right is perhap s
the key benefit of personhood for vast numbers of extant nonhuman beings .
One confusion in the view I am proposing is that it is not clear what the in-
dividual unit would be if nonhuman beings were persons
. In the case of ecosys-
tems, size and density might be variables . In the case of so-called lower life -
forms, swarms, schools, and flocks might be single persons . I am not sure that a
dog would qualify as a person (I know that many would disagree here) althoug h
I am quite certain that a single elephant, dolphin, or chimpanzee would .
I have presented an extreme view which many would consider absurd and
utopian . My hope is that reasoned objections to such a view will pinpoint th e
kinds of reasons which underly present legal policies and moral oblivion con-
cerning natural beings .
I anticipate three main lines of objection to including nonhuman beings in
the domain of persons : religious, commercial, and speciesist . The religious ob-
jection sanctifies human dominance over the land, its resources and animals, on
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the grounds that a (for the most part, Christian) God created human beings t o
subdue and rule the Earth . There is no empirical foundation for this objection .
The commercial objection is an unfortunate result of the historical ways in
which the Western technological project seems to have acquired the capacity to
monetize everything on the planet . This project appears to have no bounds and i t
even has a poor record for the sustenance of human life in situations of conflic t
with market values . The speciesist objection is difficult to sustain on secular
grounds, as a moral position, and it is theoretically weak in the face of geneti c
engineering and cyborg technologies which are now on the horizon, that is, bot h
hereditary and morphological material from other species may become ordinar y
components of human beings . Furthermore, should there ever be encounters
with extraterrestrial intelligent life, human speciesism will be even more diffi-
cult to defend .
The most general values of human development and flourishing would b e
served by granting personhood to ecosystems and natural beings . It would make
us all more virtuous and, in the long run, the quality of human life would b e
better . But these utilities to humans would be secondary gains, so to speak, and
not primary reasons for including natural beings in the domain of persons .
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